Reframing the Possible: Rancierian aesthetics and the study of organization by Beyes, Timon
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
DigitalCommons@WPI
Aesthesis Archive Organizational Aesthetics
1-1-2008
Reframing the Possible: Rancierian aesthetics and
the study of organization
Timon Beyes
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/aesthesis
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Business Commons
To access supplemental content and other articles, click here.
Volume 2, Issue 1
Pages 32-41
This Volume 2, Issue 1 is brought to you for free and open access by the Organizational Aesthetics at DigitalCommons@WPI. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Aesthesis Archive by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WPI.
Recommended Citation
Beyes, Timon, (2008). "Reframing the Possible: Rancierian aesthetics and the study of organization". Aesthesis: International Journal of
Art and Aesthetics in Management and Organizational Life, Volume 2, Issue 1, p. 32-41.
http://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/aesthesis/20
ISSN 1751-9853
MeMory aNd 
orgaNIzatIoNal 
lIfe
guest editors: Pierre guillet de 
Monthoux and antonio Strati
Alberto Zanutto
Mikael Scherdin
Timon Beyes
Terry Brown & Kathy Mack
Niina Koivunen
Klaus Harju
also
Ben Johnson 
on the liverpool Cityscape
Barbara loftus
on visual narrative
Claire Jankelson
on the aesthetics of listening
Volume 2//one: 2008
Aesthesis
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l jo
ur
na
l o
f a
rt
 a
nd
 a
es
th
et
ic
s 
in
 m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 o
rg
an
iza
tio
na
l li
fe
ISSN 1751-9853
edItors
Ian W. King, essex Management Centre, University of essex, Colchester, UK
Jonathan Vickery, Centre for Cultural Policy studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK 
Ceri Watkins, essex Management Centre, University of essex, Colchester, UK
edItorIAl CoordInAtor 
Jane Malabar
aesthesis@essex.ac.uk
edItorIAl AdVIsory BoArd
dawn Ades, University of essex, UK
daved Barry, Universidade nova de lisboa, Portugual
Jo Caust, University of south Australia, editor, Asia Pacific Journal of Arts and Cultural Management
Pierre Guillet de Monthoux, University of stockholm, sweden
laurie Heizler, Wright Hassall llP, leamington spa, UK
stephen linstead, University of york, UK
nick nissley, the Banff Centre, Canada
Antonio strati, University of trento and University of siena, Italy
steve taylor, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, UsA 
aesthesis: 
International Journal of Art and Aesthetics in Management and 
Organizational Life
is published by 
the aesthesis project
the Aesthesis Project was founded in January 2007 and is a research project investigating art and aesthetics in management and organizational 
contexts. the project has its roots in the first Art of Management and organization Conference in london in 2002, with successive conferences held 
in Paris and Krakow. From those events emerged an international network of academics, writers, artists, consultants and managers, all involved in 
exploring and experimenting with art in the context of management and organizational research. the Aesthesis Project will be developing extensive 
research and artistic projects internationally, with academic research fellows and associate creative practitioners, publications and consultancy.
http://www.essex.ac.uk/aesthesis/
desIGn & Art dIreCtIon
Jonathan Vickery
dIGItAl ArtWorK
Integra Communications, oxford, UK
PrInter
Warwick Print, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
The views and assertions articulated in this publication do not necessarily represent the views or
 judgements of the editors or of The Aesthesis Project.  
Issn 1751-9853
Aesthesis © 2007: the Aesthesis Project
Editorial  // 2
Themed secTion:  AEsthEtics/thE construction And rE-
construction of mEmoriEs of orgAnizAtionAl lifE
 themed section editors: Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and Antonio Strati 
ponte dei sospiri: bridging Art And AEsthEtics in orgAnizAtionAl 
mEmoriEs 
Introduction: Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and Antonio Strati  // 4
rEprEsEnting orgAnizAtionAl AEsthEtics: An opEn issuE At 
EvEry  stAgE of fiEld rEsEArch
Alberto Zanutto //8
frAmEd: nEW mEthod And subjEctivE grounds 
Mikael Scherdin  // 16
rEfrAming thE possiblE: rAnciÈriAn AEsthEtics And thE study 
of orgAnizAtion
Timon Beyes  //32
crEAting multimEdiA: A ‘rE-prEsEntAtion’ of shipboArd 
orgAnizAtionAl lifE pAst 
Terry Brown and Kathy Mack  //42
thE rEcording of contEmporAry clAssicAl music: rElAtionAl 
AEsthEtics, And somE mAnAgEmEnt too 
Niina Koivunen  //52
sAudAdE -- port sAlut
Klaus Harju  //64
finAlE: gAttiÈrEs skEtchEs
Pierre Guillet de Monthoux //73 
also
nEo-clAssicism: A cAll for pApErs 
Ralph Bathurst and Wendelin Küpers //78
thE livErpool cityscApE: Art of mEmory
Ben Johnson //80 
WAtch: A visuAl nArrAtivE About mEmory And chiildhood 
Barbara Loftus //88
story As imAginAtion: An AEsthEtics of listEning 
Claire Jankelson //112 
CoNTENTS
AESTHESIS  Vol. 2 // oNE: 2008 // 3
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of organizational life
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pierre guillet de monthoux
& Antonio strati
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// Pierre Guillet de Monthoux 
(2004) has a clear predilection for 
the arts as an arena and laboratory 
for aesthetic experiments. The 
arts have an important role as 
showcases of aesthetic practices 
threatened and marginalized 
by bureaucracy and corporate 
managerialism. Pierre is thus 
particularly keen to understand 
and enhance the aesthetics of 
the organization through artistic 
intervention.
// Antonio Strati (1999) 
emphasises aesthetics as a 
central but forgotten dimension of 
‘organizational life’. He focuses on 
sensible knowledge and aesthetic 
judgment in everyday organizational 
practices, and is particularly keen 
to highlight that the negotiation 
of organizational aesthetics gives 
form to the organization and 
also shapes power relations in 
organizational cultures.
These two diverse emphases 
regarding art and aesthetics in 
the study of organizations have 
also configured two different 
approaches – among others 
– in organizational aesthetics 
research: namely, the artistic 
Do you know when you see it, or do you see it only when you know 
it? Is it a matter of intention or is it something in the eye of the 
beholder? Is it a phenomenon or is it a perspective? How, then, do 
you express it, or how do you represent it? These are just some 
of the questions requiring an answer when ‘aesthetics’ enters the 
realm of social science. The themed papers section of this issue of 
Aesthesis is aesthetics and the construction and re-construction 
of memories of organizational life – such considerations seemed 
omnipresent to the researchers who gathered in the little village of 
Gattières,1 southern France, for the Third EIASM Workshop on ‘Art, 
Aesthetics and organization’ in July 2007.  on this occasion, as in 
the past, the common ‘call for papers’ was intended to emphasise 
the dialectics that give strength to the ongoing configuration of an 
aesthetic discourse on organization. Art and aesthetics, in fact, are 
not understood in the same way by both of us.
Ponte dei Sospiri: Bridging Art 
and Aesthetics in organizational Memories Introduction by Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and Antonio Strati
approach (Guillet de Monthoux et.al., 2007) and the aesthetic approach 
(Strati, 2008). The artists, art critics, and organizational scholars who 
responded to our common call for papers for these three workshops  – 
the first held in Siena in 2000, the second in Gattières in 2003, and the 
third again in Gattières, in 2007 – were in various ways catering to each 
convener’s special interests. Their participation, however, did not give rise 
to a clear separation between the two research styles. on the contrary, 
participants and organizers shared the conviction that both performing art 
and aesthetic comprehension must be part of our understanding of the 
social processes of organizing action. This conviction was shared both by 
participating organizational and managerial scholars and such prominent 
guests from art world and industrial design such as Alberto Alessi, 
Michelangelo Pistoletto, Hans-Ulrich obrist, Maria Finders and Daniel 
Birnbaum. Symbolic of this interaction is the Human Relations special issue 
on ‘organizing Aesthetics’, featuring the script of a performance (Steyeart 
and Hjorth, 2002) inspired by the first workshop held in Siena. This was a 
novelty in an organization studies publication. But even though it appeared 
in such a prestigious journal, it did not engender much of a hybridization 
of art and aesthetics in organizational research and writing. The two 
approaches did not merge together. Rather, they continued to propose, 
each on the basis of its distinctive characteristics, a common ground 
for transgressive and novel forms of conducting and representing field 
research and the theoretical study of organization. In a word, what they 
had in common was simply a genuine and profound desire for ... aesthetics!
This issue of Aesthesis reminds us of this desire for aesthetics in our 
knowledge of organizations. When Alberto Zanutto writes that the task of 
research is to ‘valorize aesthetics’, he articulates an almost programmatic 
aspiration -- aesthetics as an escape from a one-dimensional idea of 
reality. Zanutto’s long experience as a researcher on a variety of projects 
seems to have shown how aesthetics can be ‘smuggled’ into traditional 
organizational inquiries. What memories can one represent, firstly to 
the researcher him/herself, secondly to colleagues involved in the same 
research, and thirdly to organizational students and scholars, and to the 
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organizational actors themselves? Zanutto’s article can be read as an 
ongoing fragmented aesthetic memoir. It also stands as a quest for a 
deeper understanding of aesthetics in organizational field research, which 
polemicizes functionalism’s basic assumptions in order to open the way for 
aesthetic experience itself. How can traditional, rather ‘square’ research, 
be turned into a multidimensional inquiry -- thus providing an aesthetic 
research team with techniques for an aesthetic research process that 
will constructively confuse the binary boredom of an aesthetic reading 
of organization dynamics! Like most freedom fighters, however, Zanutto 
somewhat over-simplifies matters. It is difficult to argue that reality is life 
whilst rationalism is death; for both are part of our desire for freedom. 
However, his contribution is a viable first step towards transforming the 
representation of the outcomes of social science research into forms of 
aesthetic organizational memory.
 
Mikael Scherdin’s argument stands in sharp contrast to Zanutto’s strong 
belief that aesthetic organizational research and the researcher’s 
personal aesthetic comprehension of organizational phenomena should 
be grounded in negotiation with colleagues. Scherdin’s contribution 
evokes a tension between an almost romantic belief in subjectivity 
for subjectivity’s sake on the one hand, and on the other a view of 
aesthetics as a social phenomenon that constantly puts the idea of a 
given subject in constant danger. We ourselves recognize this tension 
in our own editorial divergences: Pierre Guillet de Monthoux´s interests 
in art are viewed with some scepticism by Antonio Strati on account 
that art might well obstruct our analysis of aesthetics out there in the 
field. However, this issue’s references to art critic and curator Nicolas 
Bourriaud´s understanding of contemporary art as performing a ‘relational 
aesthetics’ (Bourriaud, 1998), and Guillet de Monthoux’s predilection for 
Joseph Bueys´ definition of art as ‘social sculpture’, indicate that we are 
immersed in the intricacies of a controversy. Scherdin´s rather radical 
position begs the question of whether organizational aesthetics can be 
adequately represented  by adopting such an individualistic style in field 
research. Comparisons with Zanutto’s article may thus help us grasp 
the delicate nuances of organizational research in practice, in ways that 
induce diverse states of aesthetic feeling in the researcher. Here we get 
a feel for how to ‘legitimate’ certain forms of aesthetic understanding 
through a process of negotiation in the context of a plurality of individual 
aesthetic understandings. This contrasts with the aesthetic ‘self-
legitimation’ assumed by Scherdin’s ‘autoethnographic’ re/construction 
of the aesthetics of his individual organizational memories. Moreover, 
both articles echo broader methodological controversies in social 
studies, and one can see emerging a process by which the study of the 
aesthetic is negotiating its own legitimacy in the context of mainstream 
methodologies. In a sense, this brings us back to the central issue in 
aesthetic organizational research, that of the epistemological controversy 
(Taylor and Hansen, 2005) – but with a touch of novelty introduced by the 
specific characteristics of these two research experiences.
These methodological reflections can be understood in a new light 
through Timon Beyes’ detailed account of Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic 
philosophy. When organizing the 2007 Gattières workshop, we 
recommended this French philosopher to the participants. His booklet 
Le partage du sensible (2000), as well other works such as Malaise dans 
l’esthétique (2004), raises issues that are not strictly bound to the art 
world but encompass the way in which our world offers itself to be shared 
and divided up in our daily perception of it. This philosophical aesthetics 
has recently gained fame in art schools and amongst young artists. French 
theory, however, has a very special way of elucidating how aesthetics is 
a fundamental approach to social 
philosophizing, and it signalled for 
us exactly what the title of this 
introduction indicates: bridging art 
to aesthetics (and back). 
Beyes’ article provides a ‘crash 
course’ in this aesthetic philosophy. 
Rancière sees the formation of 
new arenas, the emergence of 
new collectives, and the voicing of 
new desires, and this new activity 
is fundamentally aesthetic. It is 
up to aesthetic intuition to give 
form to, to organize if you prefer, 
otherwise silenced and suppressed 
phenomena. Rancière’s aesthetic 
perspective opens up what might 
be called a political analysis, and it 
is, as Beyes makes clear, ‘critical’ 
in the sense of relying on the 
self-organizing force of aesthetic 
intuition. The researcher is not 
a judge nor an expert once s/
he has opted for an aesthetic 
approach. S/he develops a 
sensitivity to aesthetic forces that 
are profoundly liberating because 
they creatively generate their own 
trajectories, rather than simply 
voicing dialectic criticism or staging 
violent revolts. 
While illustrating Rancière’s 
aesthetics, Beyes alludes to 
possible implications for the 
study of organizing processes. 
Beyes also claims that Rancière’s 
organizational aesthetics has 
emerged as a philosophical 
alternative to the implicit 
authoritarianism of aesthetically 
engaged sociologies, like that 
of Pierre Bourdieu. Hence his 
article raises an issue similar to 
that encountered in the tension 
between Zanutto’s and Scherdin’s 
articles: the tension between an 
aesthetics implicitly imposing 
something that ‘ought to be’ and 
an aesthetics that only reveals 
the organizational control of the 
sensible in order to defy and 
escape it – as in Strati’s aesthetics 
(1999) or Gagliardi’s empathic-
logical approach (2006). The 
question of who is most prone 
to open up organizational life – a 
sociological researcher or an 
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aesthetic philosopher – still remains. 
Terry Brown and Kathy Mack 
provide a concrete example that 
might appeal to Rancière. They 
show that aesthetic research 
forces us to assume a new stance 
as social scientists. As they 
reflect on common organizational 
memories, Brown and Mack 
are compelled to give form to 
everyday artifacts in order to 
invoke the aesthetic dimension 
of collective memory. Zanutto 
insists that aesthetic research 
consists of encounters within a 
team of researchers, while Scherdin 
develops arguments to defend 
the sphere of subjective action 
for individual interpretations of an 
experience. For both of them the 
outcome of the aesthetic research 
process is unclear, although one 
surmises that it would be some 
kind of organizational awareness 
of aesthetic processes in Zanutto’s 
case and some sort of art-like 
product (cut off from its context) 
in Scherdin’s. Brown and Mack, 
however, illustrate how they used 
multimedia techniques to make a 
product that was then fed back 
into the field in order to bring forth 
an aesthetic dimension common to 
both researchers and researched: 
research thus consists in crafting 
a piece of art necessary to bring 
forth forgotten aesthetic memories 
in organization.
Niina Koivunen analyses this 
process by exploring the making 
of an artistic artefact: a recording 
of contemporary classical music. 
Her contribution implicitly supports 
Brown and Mack’s account. They 
simply had to make a product to 
bring forth an aesthetic process; 
for Koivunen it was the other 
way round. There was a process 
-- the listening to contemporary 
music by aficionados with set 
values and with a set context of 
classical connoisseurs -- into which 
products (the recordings made by 
the skilled producers observed by 
Koivunen) were constantly fed. 
Rather than a process triggered by 
a product, the product was created 
by the process, and in ways that, 
according to Koivunen, seemed almost automatic and system-conditioned. 
Koivunen accordingly helps us understand the difference between what 
we usually call an artwork and what we consider a tool to bring forth the 
aesthetics of ‘non-art’ organizational life. 
Klaus Harju’s article tackles the ontological status of this dimension 
itself. It propounds the extreme idea that the aesthetic of organization 
is nostalgia for a never-existing past. This does not involve a beautiful 
utopia to come; nor an ideal of some sort of perfection to be reached. It is 
a ‘saudade’ for the always bygone retrospects, which is not the same as 
simple nostalgia for an origin. If this is what aesthetics is about, then we 
are again confronted by the fact that art and research are separated only 
by a very fine line. For how can we seriously claim that there is a difference 
between fact and fiction if Harju’s point is taken seriously? Mind you, this 
kind of fiction is not an ideal, a universal dream, or a claim to transcendent 
reality. It is a poetical fiction tainted by singularity, which can only be 
reshaped in a Nietzschean process of eternal return.
In editing this themed section of Aesthesis, however, we have not been 
able to maintain that artistic and aesthetic approaches are distinct and 
counterposed phenomena in organizational research. on the contrary, we 
have found ourselves affirming – with Rancière – that a crucial issue in 
both the aesthetic and artistic approaches to the study of organizational 
life is the changeover to a post-aesthetic discourse on organization. 
This involves a sensitivity, an awareness, and a taste that shapes 
organizational aesthetic research on the re/construction of organizational 
memories, as the capacity for aesthetic pathos in the understanding of 
organizational life. The novelist Philippe Delerm (2005: 114) – to continue 
with the French slant of this introduction – has relevantly and masterfully 
evoked:
notE
1// We surely do not need to introduce 
Siena, but we want to say a few words about 
Gattières: The 4000 inhabitants of this little 
village, situated some 20 minutes drive from 
Nice-Cote-d’Azur airport, enjoy not only art & 
aesthetics conferences: in the village there 
are three good value-for-money restaurants 
and as many nice bars for your pastis. You 
can, as conference goers, check in at the 
nice small Hotel Beau Site and then visit Le 
Jardin run by the European Center for Art and 
Management. This is an ultra-select art space 
open only one day each year for us mortals. 
Last year Benjamin Saurer put on a show for 
the conference -- starring a big Zebra painting 
and a pony in Zebra suit (see over). The rest 
of the year this art-space is devoted to the 
aesthetic education of those extraterrestrials 
frequently flying over the neighborhood in their 
tiny saucers. But there is also an annual opera 
festival performing late July: 
opus-opera@wanadoo.fr
.... tous les témoignages de 
lecteurs concordaient: on lui 
était reconnaissant d’avoir su 
inscrire dans le temps et l’espace 
des sensations détachées du 
temps, dans lesquelles chacun 
se reconnaissait pour avoir 
éprouvé non les mêmes, mais leur 
équivalent dans un lieu différent, 
avec une intensité perdue.
..... all the readers’ testimonies 
agreed: they acknowledged her 
mastery in inscribing in time 
and space sensations detached 
from the time when each reader 
recognised that they had felt not 
those sensations themselves, but 
their equivalents in another place, 
bereft of intensity.
Deleuze et....
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 This paper draws upon the work of the philosopher Jacques Rancière in 
order to outline a reconfiguration of the relation between aesthetics, 
art and organization (theory). For this, I will consider a specific notion 
of aesthetics as the distribution of the sensible that enables modes of 
articulation, that is, ways of perceiving, thinking and saying (Rancière, 
2004a). Hence, aesthetics here neither refers to a theory of taste (and its 
sensual pleasure), nor solely to art theory or the study of specific forms of 
art. For reasons that will be discussed in this paper, Rancière nevertheless 
attributes to art a significant power of rearranging and expanding 
what can be perceived and what is thinkable (Rancière, 2007b). I will 
suggest that a Rancièrian thinking of aesthetics in general, as well as its 
implications for exploring artistic endeavours in particular, are interesting 
terrain for the study of organization and the field of organizational 
aesthetics, most notably by provoking the organizational scholar to 
think about rupture and dissent, hence emergence and newness from an 
aesthetico-political perspective. 
However, this move entails a reframing of key concepts 
like aesthetics and politics. In order to highlight Rancière’s 
distinct and idiosyncratic voice on these issues, it thus seems 
necessary to prepare the terrain by sketching central tenets 
of his work. Perhaps most importantly for Rancière, aesthetics 
and politics are intertwined, either because a given division 
of the sensible “claims to recognize only real parties to the 
exclusion of all empty spaces and supplements” (Rancière, 
2004b: 226) or because politics proper resurfaces through a 
re-configuration of what is visible and expressible. Moreover, 
across the philosopher’s writings the presumption of equality 
and equal intelligence informs his ensuing notions of politics 
and education as well as aesthetics. 
In light of such axiomatic issues, the following pages cannot but 
adumbrate prolegomena for connecting Rancièrian concepts to the study 
of organization and aesthetics. This article is thus intended as a first step 
towards further and more elaborated conceptual work as well as empirical 
study. It is structured as such: First, I will follow Shusterman (2006) who has 
Reframing the possible:
 Rancièrian aesthetics and the study of organization
timon beyes
For me, the fundamental question is to explore the possibility of maintaining spaces 
of play. to discover how to produce forms for the presentation of objects forms for 
the organization of spaces, that thwart expectations. the main enemy of artistic 
creativity as well as of political creativity is consensus - that is, inscription within 
given roles, possibilities, and competences.
Jacques Rancière, Art of the possible (2007b: 263)
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recently stressed the twisted and 
messy genealogy of the notion(s) 
of aesthetics and, relatedly, the 
potential to take it into new and 
rewarding directions. Then, second, 
I will enter Rancièrian territory 
by offering a brief itinerary and 
contextualization of his thought, 
as well as an introduction to core 
ideas of his oeuvre. on these 
grounds, I will, third, focus on the 
philosopher’s reflections on the 
aesthetic, followed by, fourth, an 
inquiry into the possibilities of 
artistic practices to transform a 
given distribution of the sensible. 
Fifth and finally, I will consolidate 
my findings, pointing out what 
I consider to be important 
consequences for the discourse of 
organizational aesthetics, offering 
possible points of departure for 
further inquiry. 
Most notably, what one could call 
Rancière’s reframing of the political 
through aesthetics provokes the 
organizational scholar to engage 
with undoings and reconfigurations 
of given distributions of the 
sensible, with struggles to name 
what can be seen and with (re)
inventions of spaces. Moreover, 
and conversely, enlisting this 
perspective implies a reframing of 
the aesthetic through a notion of 
politics that is tied to the event 
of equality. As I will try to show, 
both instrumental and critical 
aesthetico-managerial discourses 
sit uneasily next to a form of 
thinking that destabilizes ‘royal 
science’ with its attempts to put 
(and keep) everything in its proper 
place. The neglect of the art world 
itself in important strands of 
organizational aesthetics seems 
to be a case in point. Rancière, 
for one, has made a significant 
case for the potentialities of 
artistic endeavours and their 
configurations of possibilities. 
Finally, or so I will argue, relating a 
Rancièrian aesthetics to the study 
of organization problematizes 
the politics of scholarship. As to 
the latter, in order to reserve this 
paper’s limited space for outlining 
an idiosyncratic notion of aesthetics, I have opted to forgo any detailed 
discussion of organization theory’s current delineations and orderings of 
the aesthetic – its very own distribution of what is visible and sayable 
(for overviews of the field see Taylor and Hansen, 2005; Warren and Rehn, 
2007; Strati, 1992, 2007).
problEmAtizing thE usE of AEsthEtics
For Rancière (2002) there is an essence to politics: disagreement. Following 
this idea, Jones and ten Bos (2007) have commented upon the ‘use’ (and 
‘misuse’) of philosophical concepts -- like the aesthetic -- in organization 
studies, stressing that the use of philosophy in the first place means 
interrupting and problematizing the conceptually taken-for-granted. 
It seems apt that Shusterman (2006), tackling ‘The Aesthetic’ in the 
journal theory, Culture & society’s special issue on ‘Problematizing Global 
Knowledge’, mainly seems to question any attempt to confine the notion 
of aesthetics. Although conventionally referring to the philosophy of art 
and beauty, ‘the concept of the aesthetic remains deeply ambiguous, 
complex and essentially contested’ (ibid.: 237). Shusterman begins his tour 
de force of a term’s twisted genealogy with Plato and Aristotle. Whereas 
the former defined the arts as mimesis, regarding them as an imperfect 
copy of ideal forms (and thus denying the autonomy of the sphere of 
art), the latter conferred more importance upon art and mimesis, mainly 
through the notion of catharsis, as what one could call a ‘safe’ arousal 
of passions within the artistic context. Moreover, Aristotle introduced 
principles like plot, character and diction for the formalistic evaluation of 
works of tragedy.
Usually, however, the discourse of aesthetics is taken to be a product of 
western modernity (Rancière, 2004a). Shusterman distinguishes between 
three distinct notions of the aesthetic. The first is related to Baumgarten 
and views aesthetics ‘as a general science of sensory perception that was 
involved in discerning and producing beauty’ (Shusterman, 2006: 239), 
thus including everyday practices within the scope of aesthetics. The 
second is traced back to Kant’s theory of taste with an emphasis on the 
beauty and the sublime in nature. The third is connected to Hegel who 
conceived of aesthetics as a scientific discipline that dealt with fine art’s 
high truths. Within academia, the focus on the fine arts as the realm of the 
aesthetical has been dominant ever since. 
However, other concepts thwart this three-fold classification. For example, 
the disputed idea of disinterestedness designates an aesthetic perception 
that ‘examines and appreciates its object not in terms of some ulterior 
motive or function ….but instead for the intrinsic value or pleasure of 
the appreciative experience itself’ (ibid: 240). Moreover, Shusterman 
mentions the idea of the freedom and autonomy of art that connects, 
in manifold forms, the argument on disinterestedness with Schiller’s 
educative function of art with its unconstrained play, to the writings of 
Benjamin, Adorno and Arendt – and, it could be added, to thinkers such 
as Deleuze, Lyotard and Rancière. For sure, there is more – for example 
the notion of aesthetics as a philosophy of life that can be traced back 
to ancient philosophical writings. Also, more recent sociological thinking 
has contributed significantly to the discourse of aesthetics, for example, 
by trying to unmask its ideological function, insisting that notions like 
disinterestedness and functionless contemplation serve power interests 
and confirm hierarchical distinctions (see especially, and to Rancière’s 
dismay, Bourdieu, 1987)1 or by inquiring into the workings of art as one 
of modern society’s autonomous spheres (Luhmann, 1999); or by arguing 
that processes of identity formation would lie at the heart of artistic 
practices and production (White, 1993).
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As this eclectic exercise of name-dropping indicates, the genealogy of the 
aesthetic is anything but straightforward. Indeed, the aesthetic ‘is obviously 
a vague, polysemic, contested and shifting signifier. But vague terms still 
signify ….Besides, its historically nested rich complexities of meaning harbor 
the promise of generating new rewarding directions of use’ (Shusterman 
2006: 243). That ‘the aesthetic’ denotes a multitude of sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes contradictory, understandings has not escaped 
the field of organization studies. In recent years, a growing body of work 
has emerged that circles around the aesthetic as ‘shorthand for knowledge 
derived from the senses, as a specific research methodology, as a specific 
literature/theoretic debate, as simply ‘Art’, as the theory of beauty, and so on’ 
(Warren and Rehn, 2007: 159; italics added).2  As Warren and Rehn (2007) have 
pointed out, this diversity should not be regarded as a problem. Philosophical 
concepts, they argue, do not stand still and resemble a manifold of energies. 
Hence, limiting them to specific instrumental purposes of organization 
theory might be misguided. With regard to the aesthetic’s twisted genealogy 
and its implications, then, one should caution against attempts to ‘fix’ the 
concept, thus denying a philosophical term its  potential to problematize and 
question notions like organization and its relation to politics. For organization 
theory, too, the study of aesthetics carries the promise of new and rewarding 
directions of use to come.
A politics of EquAlity
This line of reasoning sits comfortably next to the writings of Rancière 
who seems to be on uneven terms with those who explore the realm of 
aesthetics by trying to neatly put its assumed elements in pre-assigned 
places, denying a thinking of mixture (Rancière, 2007a). In order to more 
fully appreciate his distinct perspective on aesthetic issues, it seems 
necessary to broadly chart the mainstays of his itinerary of thought 
that, as the philosopher has acknowledged (2004b: 219 et seqq.), form 
a thread that ties together what otherwise comes across as a diverse 
collection of studies. Rancière says that he would ‘basically’ be interested 
in ‘investigating the modern forms of political subjectivization’ (Rancière, 
2003b: par. 15). As the phrasing already indicates, his oeuvre has 
interesting similarities with (and differences to) the works of other French 
so-called radical thinkers, especially Foucault,3 but also Deleuze, Nancy 
and Badiou (Deranty, 2003; Déotte, 2004; Rockhill, 2004). 
However, Rancière’s thought comes equipped with a twist, a fundamental 
intuition that seems to coherently run through his writings, namely the 
positioning of ‘equality’ as a founding axiom. ‘The equality of anyone with 
anyone else’ thus becomes a straightforward presupposition. ‘If you are 
to carry out the command of your master, you first have to understand 
it. And for this, you have to be his equal’ (Rancière, 2003b: par. 14). For 
inequality to be recognized, an ability to recognise has to be presupposed. 
Hence, a fundamental recognition of (democratic) equality has to be 
assumed. It follows that whatever determines social orderings is arbitrary: 
any form of social organization is contingent (Rancière, 2002). Equality, 
then, is neither understood as an essence or a ‘pure’ historical origin, nor 
as a teleological goal of human progress (in this abstract sense, equality 
is an ‘empty’ term that is situationally ‘filled’ and proven). It is not set up 
as a ‘structural principle’ but as a principally undetermined ‘de-structuring 
principle’ that relates each respective contingency of domination to its 
prior, fundamental contingency (Rancière, 2003b: par. 14).
Equality enables politics. But departing from the founding axiom of 
equality, Rancière sharply breaks with conventional meanings of politics. 
To begin with, any social field can be characterized by relations of 
inequality, by hierarchy, control and domination (Deranty, 2003). The force 
regulating the social field, Rancière 
(2002), following Foucault (2002), 
calls ‘the police’. Surpassing notions 
of overt repression or control, the 
police designates certain ways of 
cutting up the world, a systematic 
production of the given, an 
organization of bodies and things 
that define modes of being, doing 
and making, the sayable and the 
unsayable, and the places where 
these occupations are performed 
– a definition, thus, of how to take 
part (Rancière, 2002: 40 et seq.).4 
The political, on the other hand, 
comes about on the basis of the 
opposite principle, that of radical 
equality. Again, ‘equality’ does 
not signify a structural operator 
of historical development – it is 
a ‘vanishing condition’ (Rancière, 
2003b: par. 14) that can only 
situationally come to the fore with 
the naming of what Rancière calls 
a ‘wrong’, a miscount. Politics, 
then, is linked to dissent, to a 
polemical count of those that 
were un-counted before. A split 
emerges between given identities 
(that of the police order) and a 
new political subjectivity (Rancière, 
2002).  ‘Equality has to be involved 
in operations of subjectivization, 
in constructions of scenes of 
enunciation and manifestation 
in which uncounted objects are 
handled and signed objects are 
handled by uncounted subjects, 
and put as objects of common 
dispute’ (Rancière, 2003b: par. 15). 
Hence, politics cannot be defined 
by referring to the idea of a pre-
existing subject, and neither does 
it have its own, pre-given proper 
place.5 Rather, a ‘pre-distributed’ 
field of identities is transformed 
through a political disruption, 
which produces a new political 
subjectivity. 
Politics thus becomes a matter 
of particular situations, of events 
that pragmatically verify equality, 
of ‘polemical scenes’. It has an 
essence: ‘the production, within 
a determined, sensible world, of 
a given that is heterogeneous 
to it’ (Rancière, 2004b: 226). 
Disagreement is the fuel of politics. 
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It situationally comes to the fore 
through a taking-part of those who 
have no part.6 It is worth noting that 
one encounters here a particularly 
disruptive notion of democracy. 
The latter signifies dissociation, 
a rupture within a given order: ‘If 
politics means anything it means 
something that is added to all 
these governments of paternity, 
age, wealth, force and science …’ 
(Rancière, 2006a: 45, italics added). 
It follows that politics is not about, 
for example, laying out a scheme 
for integrating the excluded, 
but about the construction of a 
stage where matters of exclusion 
emerge as matters of conflict 
(Rancière and Höller, 2007: 459). 
Politics thus denotes a surplus 
relation, an extra, a supplement 
to any actual (ac)count of the 
population, to the regular orderings 
and apportionments. Hence, 
politics differs from assembling 
people into a community – it 
comes about when there is an 
exception to the usual operations 
of assembling (Rancière, 2001: par. 
15 et seq). Democracy, then, can 
strictly speaking not be assigned 
to a form of state: ‘We do not 
live in democracies’ (Rancière, 
2006a: 73). Rather, it emerges 
whenever there is a process of 
struggle, of enlarging the public 
sphere. ‘Democracy is first this 
paradoxical condition of politics, 
the point where every legitimization 
is confronted with its ultimate 
lack of legitimacy, confronted 
with the egalitarian contingency 
that underpins the inegalitarian 
contingency itself’ (Rancière, 
2006a: 94).7
The seemingly simple axiom 
(of equality) and the resulting 
meditations on (the practice of) 
equality, and on the question 
of who has the right to think, 
pervade Rancière’s writings 
and his ‘maverick intellectual 
itinerary’ (Ross, 1991: 59). They 
mark the philosopher’s break with 
Althusserian Marxism: in what 
seems to have been a decisive 
moment, namely the Parisian 
uprising of 1968, the ‘theoretical 
police’ of Althusserianism went up in flames on the barricades (Rancière, 
1985: 131). This was because ‘the people’ took collective matters into 
their own hands, while Althusser had serious misgivings about the whole 
affair – from his point of view, this was just not the proper moment 
(Ross, 1991). In this stance, Rancière sensed an exemplary move against 
equality inherent to (also) ‘progressive’ thought. He would later dedicate a 
magnificent study to western thought’s proposition of keeping ‘the poor’8 
in its place, a fundamental gesture uniting diverse thinkers such as Plato, 
Marx, Sartre and Bourdieu, namely the exclusion of ‘the poor’ from the 
realms of thought and art – and thus the co-implication of philosophy and 
sociology into repressive social hierarchies (Rancière, 2004b).
To these strategies of confirming the divisions of knowledge and inequality, a 
counter-move is suggested: ‘I write to shatter the boundaries that separate 
specialists – of philosophy, art, social sciences, etc. I write for those who are 
also trying to tear down the walls between specialties and competences.’ 
(Rancière, 2007b: 257) Rancière has been called a ‘confident critic: he simply 
assumes that anyone can think’ (Méchoulan, 2004: 5). The presumption of 
equality and equal intelligence seems to unfold in his writings that range from 
archival work bringing to light forgotten workers’ struggles (Rancière, 1989) 
to a much-discussed essay on education called the ignorant schoolmaster 
(Rancière, 1991); and from conceptual and polemical elaborations on the 
question(s) of politics (Rancière, 2001, 2002, 2006a) to a treatise on the 
truths and the names of History (Rancière, 1994). Furthermore, he has 
published an impressive list of studies on aesthetics and  art, that comprise  
inquiries into novelistic endeavours and the politics of literature (Rancière, 
2003a, 2004c, 2004d), forays into the world of film (Rancière, 2006d), critical 
art (Rancière, 2006b) and theatre (Rancière, 2007c) as well as general 
reflections on the aesthetic (Rancière, 2004a, 2006c, 2007a). To the latter I 
now turn. 
AEsthEtics As politicAl problEmAtic And thE 
rEgimE of Art
If ‘[p]olitics is first and foremost an intervention upon the visible and the 
sayable’ (Rancière, 2001, par. 21), then it is entangled with the question 
of aesthetics. Politics comes to the fore through dissensual scenes, when 
a given police logic clashes with a different partition of the sensible. 
Politics and aesthetics fold into one another when what is brought forth 
and made visible has been hitherto invisible, when what is made audible 
was hitherto inaudible (Rancière, 2004b). ‘These poetic displacements 
and condensations are not just secondary illustrations of an underlying 
ideological struggle, but the very terrain of this struggle.’ (Žižek, 2004: 77) 
It takes a challenging of the established orderings of ways of doing and 
making for politics to ‘happen’. And it is through new registers of what 
is perceivable that novel forms of political subjectivity come to the fore. 
‘Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, 
around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the 
properties of spaces and the possibilities of time’ (Rancière, 2004a: 13). 
There is a theatrical and literally spatial dimension to Rancière’s politics 
since the latter implies constructing a stage, producing a scene, provoking 
another space and  bodies and voices that were unheard of and unseen 
before (Deranty, 2003).9
‘Aesthetics’ thus extends from the realm of art towards general modes of 
visibility. In this broad sense, the Rancièrian notion of aesthetics does not 
denote the name of a discipline. It does not entail a theory or philosophy of 
the beautiful and the sublime or of the human senses. It signifies ‘a mode 
of articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding 
forms of visibility and possible ways of thinking about their relationships’ 
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(Rancière, 2004a: 10). However, 
Rancière also deploys the concept 
of aesthetics in another, more 
restrained albeit related sense. If 
the first notion, as outlined above, 
designates a political problematic, 
the second refers to a specific 
regime of the identification of 
art, of contemplating art (and its 
politics) (Rancière, 2000). one 
can thus distinguish between 
‘the aesthetics of politics’, that is, 
aesthetics in the broader sense, 
and ‘the politics of aesthetics’, that 
is, aesthetics in the narrower sense. 
The latter conception is linked to 
the emergence and consequences 
of what the philosopher names 
‘the aesthetic regime of the art’ 
(Rancière, 2004a). This discursive 
regime emerged some 200 years 
ago – precisely when artistic 
practices began to mess up the 
given variants of the so-called fine 
arts, when imitation and mimesis 
ceased to be appreciated as art’s 
common goals and as points of 
departure for classifying genres, 
rules of fabrication and criteria of 
appreciation. In short, it emerged 
when it became progressively 
harder to distinguish art from 
non-art. The aesthetic regime 
denotes a gaze and a thinking that 
identifies ‘art’ in the singular in 
place of the plural of the fine arts, 
and the discourse called aesthetics 
emerged in order to think this 
singular (Rancière, 2007a). 
To outline this fundamental rupture, 
Rancière broadly distinguishes 
the aesthetic regime of art from 
two other discursive ‘knots’. Like 
Shusterman alluding to Plato’s 
non-consideration of aesthetics, 
Rancière calls the first an ‘ethical 
regime of images’ that, strictly 
speaking, does not refer to an 
autonomous art at all since 
works of art are not granted any 
autonomy (Rancière, 2004a: 20 et 
seq.). The second, a ‘representative 
or poetic regime of the arts’ 
‘identifies the arts ….within a 
classification of ways of doing 
and making, and it consequently 
defines proper ways of doing 
and making as well as means 
of assessing imitation’ (Rancière, 2004a: 22). Following Aristotle, these 
ways of doing and making, of imposing a form on matter, are discussed 
according to ideas of representation and mimesis. Hence, a set of 
norms, an ordering of the relations between the visible and the sayable 
is constituted.10 The ‘representative’ regime is thus able to combine the 
notion of an autonomous art with the identification of a hierarchy of 
genres. 
This canon that allows for a neat separation between artistic objects and 
those of everyday life is ruined by the aesthetic regime of art. ‘The aesthetic 
regime asserts the absolute singularity of art and, at the same time, destroys 
any pragmatic criterion for isolating its singularity.’ It recognizes the autonomy 
of art while establishing the identity of artistic forms ‘with forms that life uses 
to shape itself’ (Rancière, 2004a: 23). In a somewhat paradoxical move, ‘art’ 
got into the position of a common sphere of experience precisely when the 
rules and regulations that allowed a clear distinction between art and non-art 
were abolished. It follows that the separation of the aesthetic sphere does 
not coincide with the notion of an artwork’s autonomy, since the aesthetic 
regime has done away with agreed-upon, determined criteria in order to 
differentiate between what belongs to art and what does not. of course, the 
‘end of mimesis’ does not imply the disappearance of representational art. It 
denotes the end of a certain discursive ordering of the fine arts. For Rancière, 
the discourse of aesthetics and its twisted genealogy from Kant to Adorno, 
via Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, has as its object the attempt 
to think this disordering and thus establishes a new and paradoxical regime 
of identifying artistic endeavours (Rancière, 2007a: 17 et seq.). Whereas the 
representative regime conferred dignity on the fine arts through the praise 
and position of those in power, of the ‘man of taste’, to the order that tied 
human nature to the nature of society and that determined the place of 
everyone; the aesthetic regime breaks up this distribution of the sensible 
(Rancière, 2007a: 22). Aesthetics in the narrower sense first and foremost 
indicates the regime that names this rupture. 
Hereinafter, art acquires its own politics (understood in Rancière’s terms). 
Since artistic products are more often than not ‘classified’ due to their 
adherence to a specific regime of the sensible (that no longer identifies art 
according to proper ways of producing it), art becomes singular, no longer 
subjected to specific rules (of doing and making it). Thus, and independent 
of attempts to consciously politicize art, the separation of the aesthetic 
sphere itself brings forward political effects. ‘A political declaration or 
manifestation, like an artistic form, is an arrangement of words, a montage 
of gestures, an occupation of spaces. In both cases what is produced is a 
modification of the fabric of the sensible, a transformation of the visible 
given, intensities, names that one can give to things, the landscape of the 
possible.’ (Rancière, 2007b: 264)
contEmporAry Art’s disjointEd junctions
If politics is conceived in terms of situational ruptures that disturb a 
given distribution of the sensible, if the aesthetics of politics denotes 
a thinking of reconfigurations of what is visible and sayable, and if the 
politics of aesthetics comes about through the equality of forms of art 
and forms of life as identified by the aesthetic regime of art, then it does 
not come as a surprise that Rancière has shown a remarkable interest 
in artistic endeavours and their possible consequences. For what other 
field could open up a ‘breathing room’ for a reconfiguration of roles and 
competences? In Rancière’s words, ‘artistic practices are ‘ways of doing 
and making’ that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and 
making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being 
and forms of visibility’ (2004a: 13). It follows that artistic inventions have 
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political effects whenever a given distribution of the sensible is blurred 
and the possibility of other practices of life and forms of organizing 
emerges, whenever such endeavours invent ‘sensible forms and material 
structures for a life to come’ (Rancière, 2004a: 29).11
Art, then, is being granted a power comparable to that of politics, namely, 
reframing and expanding what can be perceived and reconfiguring what 
is thinkable (Ross, 2007). For example, ‘the political dimension of the arts 
can be seen first of all in the way that their forms materially propose the 
paradigms of the community. Books, theatre, orchestra, choirs, dance, 
paintings or murals are modes for framing a community’ (Rancière, 2000: 17). 
With regard to contemporary art, Rancière speaks of a ‘disjointed junction’ 
that would characterize its practices due to the fuzzy border between the 
indistinguishability of forms of life and forms of art on the one hand, and 
the separation of the system of art on the other. Contemporary art’s form 
of efficacy would lie precisely in this blurring of borders and thus in the 
reconfiguration of ties between spaces and times.12 Hence it might disturb 
the logic of consensus and counteract the annulment of politics (Rancière 
and Höller, 2007: 464). of interest, then, are the capacities that are set in 
motion through artistic endeavours. 
Maybe needless to say, not every kind of art, nor art in itself, is liberating 
or emancipatory – it depends. In ‘Disagreement’, Rancière (2002) stated 
that politics itself does not take the form of a perpetual, easy-to-
trace chain of rupturing; it scarcely happens at all. In a related text, he 
confirmed that the emergence of politics is ‘in no way necessary, but that 
it occurs as a provisional accident in the history of forms of domination’ 
(Rancière, 2001: par. 17; italics added). It is, I assume, no different for the 
capacities set in motion by artistic interventions. For example, art that 
presupposes a viewers’ imbecility constitutes a rather sad spectacle when 
contrasted with the presupposition of equality. ‘An art is emancipated 
and emancipating when it renounces the authority of the imposed 
message, the target audience, and the univocal mode of explicating the 
world, when, in other words, it stops wanting to emancipate us’ (Rancière, 
2007b: 258). In an assessment of contemporary critical art (Rancière, 
2006b) as well as in other comments, the philosopher casts a critical eye 
on explicitly political, so-called ‘critical’ art, which revels in unmasking the 
workings of Capital beneath common objects and behaviours. Here, too, 
he senses a rather simple gesture of fundamental opposition that would 
be accompanied by its co-implication into the decried capitalist logic: a 
simple redoubling of the signs of neo-liberal times that deny the possibility 
of resistance and otherness. Instead, as he succinctly put it in a recent 
interview,
“..one must find ways to create other places, or other uses for 
places. But one must extricate this project from the dramatic 
alternatives expressed in questions like: How do we escape the 
market, subvert it, etc.? …. Critics of the market are content 
to rest their own authority on the endless demonstration that 
everyone else is naïve or a profiteer; in short, they capitalize on 
the declaration of our powerlessness. … And it ends up sounding 
not dissimilar to reactionary discourse. These critics of the market 
call for subversion only to declare it impossible and to abandon all 
hope for emancipation.” (Rancière, 2007b: 263)
Furthermore, not all is well either with current art practices advocating 
a  ‘relational aesthetics’ (Bourriaud, 2002), some of which have caused 
quite a stir in the art world in recent years (e.g. Doherty, 2004). The term 
‘relational aesthetics’ refers to a 
loosely assembled group of artistic 
strategies that immerse artistic 
practice into everyday human 
relations, looking for other ways 
of organizing human togetherness 
and new forms of sociability. For the 
curator and theoretician Nicolas 
Bourriaud (2002), such endeavours 
produce a breeding ground for 
social experiments by creating 
new situations and encounters.13 
Rancière, ever in favour of polemical 
scenes, has linked such attempts 
to a ‘soft-ethics of consensus’ 
and an ‘art of the neighbourhood’ 
that would perform an adaptation 
of yesteryear’s political art to 
today’s conditions (2007a: 149). 
Correspondingly, the concept of 
relational aesthetics has been 
criticized for its implied homogeneity, 
for missing out on conflict and 
dissent as important processes in 
the struggle to produce other spaces 
(Bishop, 2004).
The contemporaneous existence of 
a host of different artistic attitudes 
points towards a fundamental, 
constitutive undecidability about 
the politics of aesthetics in the 
aesthetic regime of art. Moreover, 
if the singularity of art is related 
to the indistinguishability of its 
‘autonomous’ forms with those of 
everyday life, and with a possible 
politics, then ‘[t]hese possible 
politics are only ever realized in 
full at the price of abolishing the 
singularity of art, the singularity 
of politics, or the two together’ 
(Rancière, 2007b: 92). This 
paradox also pertains to the 
classic and perhaps rather worn-
out dream of an art that would 
be able to enshrine its autonomy, 
of l’art pour l’art, resisting both 
its commodification and the 
aestheticization of products, 
merchandise and power. Rancière 
is thus equally dismissive of what, 
conversely, amounts to a ‘hard-
ethics’ of an art that is dedicated 
to celebrate the mourning of the 
catastrophe of modern society 
(Rancière, 2007a: 149). In its own 
way, such ‘hard-ethical’ reasoning 
implies ‘policing’ the field, denouncing 
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the aesthetic confusion and undecidability. But this confusion is precisely the 
‘knot’ through which disjointed junctions and, hence, new modes of thinking, 
practices and affects emerge, and are given a space. In other words, artistic 
in(ter)ventions should not be robbed of their talent of being ambiguous, 
disputable and preliminary cuts into the distributions of the sensible and thus 
the orderings of the social (Rancière, 2007a: 14 and 151). 
It remains to be seen and explored whether art today, as Rancière (2006b) 
muses, might assume a higher degree of political force by the absence or 
scarcity of politics proper. The philosopher diagnoses a shrinking of public 
space and an annulment of political imaginativeness in a time of (neo-
liberal) consensus that might endow ‘a substitutive political function’ to 
contemporary artistic practices, ‘to the mini-demonstrations of artists, to 
their collections of objects and traces, to their mechanisms of interaction, 
to their provocations in situ or elsewhere. Knowing if these ‘substitutions’ 
can recompose political spaces, or if they must be content to parody 
them, is certainly one of the questions of today.’ (2006b: 92)
prolEgomEnA to A rAnciÈriAn 
orgAnizAtionAl AEsthEtics
What could be the punch-lines of Rancièrian aesthetics with regard 
to organization studies? In conclusion, I will try to adumbrate possible 
connections between the philosopher’s reflections on (the politics of) 
aesthetics and the study of organization. To repeat, not only artistic 
but any set of practices can be called ‘aesthetics’ if it intervenes in the 
general configuration of what is perceivable, thinkable and sayable, as 
well as in the latter’s conjunctions with modes of being. Hence, such 
practices carry their own politics. For ‘the aesthetic dimension of the 
reconfiguration of the relationships between doing, seeing and saying that 
circumscribe the being-in-common is inherent to every political or social 
movement’ (Rancière, 2000: 17). Generally, researching the aesthetics of 
organizing could include the search for undoings of a given distribution of 
the sensible, reorderings of the very manner in which (public) space lends 
itself to (and is produced by) processes of organizing. However, the latter 
here denotes the organization of bodies, perceptions, thoughts and things 
over time and space – the ‘police’ – and the disruptive qualities of politics 
that, for example, might play themselves out in artistic interventions. I 
assume, then, that an organizational scholar’s perspective need not be 
restricted to a bounded notion of the organization as a distinct entity 
and to producing results (mostly) for managerial man, but that it can 
(or should) be open towards the phenomena and consequences of 
organization, that is, towards general forces of organizing that affect us 
and the conditions of our lives (Cooper, 1998). Rancièrian thinking, or so 
I would argue, can be perceived as a convincing demonstration of the 
importance of aesthetics for describing such forces of organizing.
Moreover, one should not gloss over Rancière’s insistence on the de-
structuring principle of equality. Democratic disagreement does not 
refer to situations in which the conflicting parties are already known, 
exchanging well-rehearsed arguments. Instead, the noise of politics 
announces disjointed junctions, the appearance of new political 
subjectivities. For one, aesthetics thus loses its conceptual innocence, 
if it ever had one – this kind of aesthetico-organizational research 
would not concern itself with frivolities (Warren and Rehn, 2006: 81). 
But more importantly, such thinking interferes with the perhaps all-
too-useful distinction between an instrumental use of aesthetics in 
organization theory (that would turn aesthetics into mere material for 
managerial domination) and its counterpart, the critical unmasking of the 
instrumentalization of aesthetics as yet another means for managerial 
control. Hancock considers the 
former strategy to be founded 
upon a ‘romanticized account of 
the aesthetic as a particular mode 
of knowing and being in the world’ 
(2005: 31); whereas the critical 
approach engages with aesthetics 
as a homogenizing force within 
managerial colonization (Hancock, 
2002; Cairns, 2002; Warren and 
Rehn, 2006) and the ‘corporate 
production of the labour of 
aesthetics’ (Witz et al., 2003: 35). An 
aesthetics informed by Rancière’s 
writings disrupts the safe bet 
of employing aesthetics either 
affirmatively or ‘purely’ critically. 
For sure, it resists incorporation 
into a managerial logic that 
fundamentally departs from a logic 
of inequality, only to prove it again 
and again. 
However, as indicated in 
Rancière’s treatment of critical 
art, it also problematizes the 
gesture of acknowledging nothing 
but managerial colonization, 
of singing the ‘oppression 
blues’ (Guillet de Monthoux, 
2006). Instead, this notion of 
aesthetics urges us to locate 
those time-spaces in which an 
‘excess of words’ (Rancière, 
1994: 33) or an excess of signs 
and forms suspends the relation 
between the order of space and 
speech and the order of bodies 
(Chambers, 2005) – the orderings 
of organizing. Rancière’s work is 
a call to count on the possibility 
of polemical scenes and of the 
noise of politics that accompanies 
the reconfiguration of a given 
distribution of the sensible.
of course, already the identification 
of such an aesthetico-political 
event is conflict-ridden. Dissensual 
scenes are of the moment and 
provisional. ‘Political difference 
is always on the shore of its own 
disappearance…, the space of a 
people’s public demonstration is 
always at risk of being confused 
with the merchant’s agora, etc.’ 
(Rancière, 2001: par. 25). In what 
seems to amount to a call for 
situational analysis, there is thus a 
need, I think, and an opportunity to 
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‘sociologize Rancière’ (quite possibly 
a provocative choice of words in 
light of the philosopher’s comments 
on the ‘royal science’ of sociology). 
More precisely, the philosopher’s 
notion of aesthetics lends itself 
quite pragmatically to empirical 
work. Not only has Rancière 
often used events of the day as 
material to consider and sharpen 
his arguments (see e.g. Rancière, 
2005), his major themes can be 
traced back to spending time in 
workers’ archives and adding his 
voice to their forgotten struggles 
(Rancière, 1989). There is a sort 
of empirical operativeness, a 
plasticity inherent to his writings 
that seems readily applicable 
for concrete situations (Deranty, 
2003). As noted above, moreover, 
Rancière is a fond user of spatial 
vocabulary – see only his referring 
to politics as a transformation of 
a so-called public, policed ‘space 
of ‘moving-along’ into a space 
for the appearance of a subject: 
i.e. the people, the workers, the 
citizens: it consists in refiguring 
the space, of what there is and 
what to do there, what is to be 
seen or named therein’ (Rancière, 
2001: par. 22). 
A count of the uncounted is 
possible whenever a space is 
produced from which new voices 
can be spoken and heard. For 
example, everyday urban struggles 
‘to name neglected spatialities 
and invent new ones’ (Amin and 
Thrift, 2002: 4) seem to deliver 
interesting possibilities to observe 
and recount possible partakings 
of those that have no part. The 
kind of organizational aesthetics 
I am arguing for would thus imply 
an empirical engagement with 
the ‘poetic’ moments, when the 
excluded bring forth their own 
claims – when they speak for 
themselves – or when artistic 
endeavours disturb existing orders 
of what is visible and sayable 
(Žižek, 2004).
Furthermore, since the 
philosophical tradition of 
thinking aesthetics is dominated 
by reflecting upon the fine arts, declaring that art itself would have 
hardly anything to do with organizational aesthetics is somewhat 
surprising. In some readings of organizational aesthetics, concerns with 
art, the art system and artistic enterprise are slipping from view by 
limiting the ‘aesthetic approach’ to a specific mode of understanding 
organizations (e.g. Strati 2000, 2007; Gagliardi 2006). Unencumbered by 
this distinction, a number of studies have been conducted that testify 
to art’s potential for redistributing the sensible and, hence, of its 
organizational effects (see Guillet de Monthoux, 2004; Rehn and Sköld, 
2005; Steyaert, 2006; Vickery, 2006; Beyes 2006; Beyes and Steyaert, 
2006; Warren, 2006; Sliwa and Cairns, 2007). 
over the years Rancière has made a significant case for the 
potentialities of an art that, in the aesthetic regime, is no longer 
identified through specific rules and regulations of doing and making. 
Perhaps contemporary art is more sensitive to the possibility of social 
change than science, precisely because it can be characterized by the 
effacement of boundaries up to the point of its disappearance as a 
distinct practice, as Funcke (2007) speculates. In light of Rancière’s 
writings, then, I would strongly argue for taking the art world seriously 
in organizational research and for regarding it as a breeding ground 
for potential modes and structures for a life to come.14 I thus suggest 
opening the study of the aesthetics of organization towards a 
‘topography of the configuration of possibilities, a perception of the 
multiple alterations and displacements that make up forms of political 
subjectivization and artistic invention’ (Rancière, 2007b; italics added).
Finally, these prolegomena of relating Rancièrian aesthetics to 
the study of organization cannot avoid the question of the politics 
of scholarship. It seems obvious that, in light of notions such as 
conflict, dissent and rupture, an organizational aesthetics informed 
by Rancière’s thought would entail a (re)politicization of research, 
a questioning of consensus and a cultivating of conflict (de Cock, 
2006). After all, ‘[c]onsensus is the reduction of politics to the police’ 
(Rancière, 2001, par. 32).15 Seen this way, organization theory might 
be assessed as contributing its fair share to the annulment of politics 
in favour of (business school) interests (Perrow, 2000). Moreover, the 
politics of writing ‘organization’ extends to the role and self-image an 
organizational scholar assumes for him- or herself. Particularly in the 
philosopher and his poor, Rancière (2004b) has convincingly forwarded 
what could be called a deconstruction of philosophy’s (and, for 
Rancière, sociology’s) self-proclaimed position of mastery. Hereinafter, 
a critical study of organization would refrain from merely ‘speaking for’ 
the presumably dominated, thus possibly silencing or excluding actual 
struggles of emancipation. Instead, the task becomes adding one’s 
voice to such struggles, to listen rather than interpret and to attempt 
to ‘help …. resound, to make …. circulate’ (Deranty, 2003: par. 1). of course, 
disputing the critical researcher’s emplacement and stance is far from 
new. However, Rancière’s insistence on resisting easy classification and 
grand conceptual musings, the moving pertinence of his attempts to 
add his voice to worker-poets, forgotten revolutionaries of education, 
and to the dreams of anonymous thinkers (Ross, 1991), could reframe 
the discussion by posing a simple, albeit unsettling question: What if 
equality were the point of departure?   //
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1// For reasons that are well worth pondering 
and that will be touched upon later, Bourdieu’s 
strategy of unmasking Kantian ‘pure’ taste 
as simply Bourgeois taste, thus implying 
that the philosopher would not know the 
underlying motives of what he says, has 
been strongly criticized by Rancière: ‘The 
science effect produced by the sociologist 
…. results in the expulsion of everything 
not reducible to an effect of distinction. …. 
The ‘vulgarity’ of the sociologist …. is only 
the disenchanted banality of the learned 
opinion of his time, which, with an amused 
eye, regards the witnesses of that age when 
philosophers believed in the future of equality 
and proletarians in the inspirations of poets’ 
(Rancière, 2004b: 190 et seqq). For more 
on this, see the scathing chapter on ‘The 
Sociologist King’ in the philosopher and his 
poor (Rancière, 2004b). However, Rancière 
addresses selected influential works of the 
sociologist, particularly distinctions 1987). For 
a ‘different Bourdieu’ on questions of possible 
effects of art see Bourdieu and Haake (1995).
2// Gagliardi (2006) relates the growing 
interest in aesthetics to the recent inquiries 
into the role of emotions, to approaches that 
view society as a network of practices in time 
and space with objects as active presences, 
to the diagnosis of a general aestheticization 
of the economy and social life, to the 
blossoming research on the human body and 
to epistemological developments such as new 
fieldwork techniques that explicitly rely on the 
researcher’s sensibilities. one could add here 
an interest in the so-called ‘creative industries’ 
and the recent attention directed at spatial 
thinking.
3// Rancière (2000) has expressis verbis 
acknowledged his debt to Foucault, especially 
the latter’s genealogical thought and his 
notion of ‘episteme’. However, ‘I am much 
more sensitive to crossings-over, repetitions, 
or anachronisms in historical experience. … 
..[W]here Foucault thinks in terms of limits, 
closure and exclusion, I think in terms of 
internal division and transgression’ (2000: 13).
4// In his hunt through the archives and 
literatures of the 18th century, Foucault 
(2002) unearthed a positive notion of the 
police which works upon whole populations 
(as the emerging field in which to intervene 
through political and administrative power) 
and whose purpose is thus defined as seeing 
to living. Fittingly, in Germany at that time 
the science of administration was called 
polizeiwissenschaft (science of the police). 
In contemporary society, then, the police 
is ‘exerted through all sorts of channels 
in the social body as well as through the 
managerial organisms of the state and the 
market’ (Rancière, 2007b: 264) – including, 
I assume, Management Science as today’s 
polizeiwissenschaft.
5// That is why the philosopher states 
that he would not be a political philosopher 
(Rancière, 2003b: par. 10). From his 
perspective, politics is opposed to philosophy 
since the latter traditionally entails coming 
up with justifications and explanations for the 
given social and political orders. ‘By defining 
its object in relation to the social hierarchy, 
political philosophy ends up defining a non-
political object.’ (Deranty, 2003: par. 3).
6// It follows that the conceptual restriction 
of politics to the exercise of, and the struggle 
for, power means abolishing politics (Rancière, 
2001: par. 1). Moreover, in ‘Disagreement’ 
(2002) Rancière directly confronts a 
Habermasian ‘proceduralist’ notion of 
democracy. Where the latter presupposes 
political subjects, a given public sphere and 
situations of disagreement, i.e. partners 
within communicative exchange and their 
validity claims, for Rancière democratic 
struggles consist of the production of political 
subjects, so to speak, of the enlargement of 
the public sphere through new entitlements 
to take part and be seen. From this point of 
view, a Habermasian politics resembles a 
consensual management of transparently 
visible diverging interests. Instead, Rancière’s 
style of meditating on instances of 
disagreement poses not a(nother) theory 
of political communication but an idea that 
denies the very possibility of a communicative 
rationality (Chambers, 2005: par. 2).
7// However, this does not boil down to a 
utopian hope of the egalitarian society-to-
come. Rather, ‘egalitarian society is only ever 
the set of egalitarian relations that are traced 
here and now through singular and precarious 
acts’ (Rancière, 2006a: 97).
8// The abstract notion of the ‘poor’ does not 
refer to a socio-economic and pre-existing 
class, but to those who have no part and are 
not taken into account. It designates more than 
a social category, namely those who from the 
point of view of the philosopher and sociologist 
kings do not think and write as well as the 
‘other’ to the liberal-democratic police order 
(Rancière, 2001: par. 12). The poor, then, comes 
into being with the interruption of politics, it 
‘emerges when it makes its very claim to be 
counted’ (Chambers, 2005: par. 13).
9// However, this interrelatedness has 
nothing to do with the often-heard claim 
of an aestheticization of power’s forms 
and manifestations, like theatrical party 
conventions or the so-called experience 
economy’s infatuation with performativity 
(see Pine and Gilmore, 1999; Thrift, 2002). 
Moreover, the close proximity of aesthetics 
and politics might irritate readers that 
cling to a Benjaminian concern about the 
aestheticization of politics.
10// Rancière does not want to insinuate 
that every artwork would have adhered to the 
criterion of resemblance until the emergence 
of the aesthetic regime of art. The criterion 
designates ‘a fold in the distribution of ways of 
doing and making .…., a fold that renders the 
arts visible. It is not an artistic process but a 
regime of visibility regarding the arts.’ (Rancière, 
2004a: 22).
11// If such statements come across as 
overly romantic with regard to art’s possible 
effects, then Rancière’s notion of an ‘aesthetic 
revolution’ that has lead to the aesthetic regime 
of art, cogently counteracts such scepticism. As 
the philosopher has pointed out in fascinating 
studies on literature and the novel (Rancière, 
2003a, 2004c), the importance of the social 
body that came to fascinate social thinkers, ‘the 
honour conferred on the commonplace,’ had 
been part of the ‘science of literature’ before 
becoming part and parcel of the social sciences 
(Rancière, 2004a: 33). The modern novel played 
an important role in pioneering models of 
relating the presentations of facts with ways of 
rendering them intelligible. These ‘patterns’ of 
arranging signs and images, of connecting what 
is seen and what is said, later found their way 
into the analyses of the social sciences. The 
emergence of the human and social sciences is 
thus related to and draws upon what Rancière 
calls the ‘phantasmagoric dimension of the true’ 
(ibid.: 34) that was brought forth by the arts and 
‘flattened’ into positivist sociological concepts. 
‘Marx’s commodity stems from the Balzacian 
shop.’ (Rancière, 2004d: 20).
12// According to the philosopher Peter 
Sloterdijk (2007), we are witnessing an 
inflation of the displayable (des Ausstellbaren) 
in the world of art, provoked by a ‘two-fold 
revolution’: First, the radical self-liberation of 
artistic expression, and second, the seemingly 
unstoppable proliferation of what counts 
as art. For Sloterdijk, contemporary art that 
knows better leaves museum and gallery 
spaces and steps back from being ‘artfair-
art’ (Kunstmessen-Kunst). Instead, it joins 
the people, putting to disposition both its 
artistic form (Werkform) and its value-form 
(Wertform), hence looking for other, often 
ephemeral spaces.
13// Relational art thus implies that an artwork 
becomes a ‘social interstice’, ‘an art taking 
as its theoretical horizon the realm of human 
interactions and its social context, rather than 
the assertion of an independent and private 
symbolic space’ (Bourriaud, 2002: 14). Intent on 
inventing new forms of sociability, the sphere 
of human relations – ‘meetings, encounters, 
events, various types of collaboration 
between people, games, festivals, and places 
of conviviality’ (ibid.: 28) - is turned into the 
’material’ from which artistic forms emerge. 
Such experiments do not follow a utopian 
agenda but share an interest in provisional, 
fleeting situations: ‘This chance can be summed 
up in just a few words: learning to inhabit the 
world in a better way’ (ibid.: 15).
14// For an attempt to relate Rancièrian 
aesthetics to artistic endeavours – 
specifically, the activities in East Berlin’s 
former people’s palace (palast der republik) 
– and to the study of organization see 
Beyes (2008).
15// agreements (Rancière, 2002). The 
essence of consensus is the closing-down 
of politics, i.e. ‘the annulment of dissensus 
as the separation of the sensible from itself, 
the annulment of surplus subjects, the 
reduction of the people to the sum of the 
parts of the social body, and of the political 
community to the relationship of interests 
and aspirations of these different parts’ 
(Rancière, 2001: par. 32).
AESTHESIS  Vol. 2 // oNE: 2008 // 41
rEfErEncEs
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (2002) Cities: reimagining 
the Urban, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beyes, T. (2006) ‘City of enterprise, 
city as prey? on urban entrepreneurial 
spaces’, Steyaert, C., Hjorth, D., eds. 
entrepreneurship as social Change. A third 
Movements in entrepreneurship Book, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 251-270.
Beyes, T. (2008, forthcoming) ‘Spaces 
of intensity: Urban entrepreneurship 
as redistribution of the sensible’, in 
Hjorth, D. Steyaert, C., eds. the politics 
and Aesthetics of entrepreneurship, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Beyes, T., and Steyaert C.,(2006) ‘Justifying 
Theatre in organizational Analysis: A 
Carnivalesque Alternative?’ Consumption, 
Markets & Culture 9(2): 100-110.
Bishop, C. (2004) ‘Antagonism and Relational 
Aesthetics’, october 110 (Fall 2004): 51-80.
Bourdieu, P. (1987) die feinen Unterschiede. 
Kritik der gesellschaftliche Urteilskraft, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Bourdieu, P., and Haake H. (1995) Free exchange, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bourriaud, N. (2002) relational Aesthetics, 
Dijon-quetigny: Les presses du réel.
Cairns, G. (2002) ‘Aesthetics, morality and 
power: Design as espoused freedom and implicit 
control’, Human relations, 55(7): 799-820.
Chambers, S. (2005) ‘The Politics of 
Literarity’, theory & event 8(3).
Cooper, R. (1998) ‘Interview with Robert 
Cooper’ in Chia, R.C.H., ed. organized Worlds: 
explorations in technology and organization 
with robert Cooper, London/New York: 
Routledge.
de Cock, C. (2006) ‘questioning Consensus, 
Cultivating Conflict’, Journal of Management 
inquiry 15(1): 18-30.
Déotte, J.-L. (2004) ‘The Differences 
between Rancière’s Mésentente (Political 
Disagreement) and Lyotard’s Différend’, 
substance 33(1): 77-90.
Deranty, J.-P. (2003) ‘Rancière and 
Contemporary Political ontology’, theory & 
event 6(4). 
Doherty, C., ed. (2004) Contemporary Art: 
From studio to situation, London, Black Dog 
Publishing.
Foucault, M. (2002) ‘“omnes et singulatim”: 
Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in 
Faubian, J. D., ed. power: essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-84 (Vol. 3) London: Penguin 
Books: 298-325.
Funcke, B. (2007) ‘Displaced Struggles’, 
Artforum, March 2007: 282-285, 341.
Gagliardi, P. (2006) ‘Exploring the Aesthetic 
Side of organizational Life’, Clegg, S. R.  et. 
al., eds. the sage Handbook of organization 
studies (2nd ed), London, Thousand oaks 
and New Delhi: Sage: 701-724.
Guillet de Monthoux, P. (2004) the Art Firm: 
Aesthetic Management and Metaphysical 
Marketing, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Guillet de Monthoux, P. (2006) ‘The 
oppression Blues - or the Aesthetics of a 
Critical Theorist’, Consumption Markets & 
Culture, 9(2): 145 - 146.
Hancock, P. (2002) ‘Aestheticizing the world of 
organization: Creating beautiful untrue things’, 
tamara : Journal of Critical postmodern 
organization science, 2(1): 91-106.
Hancock, P. (2005) ‘Uncovering the Semiotic 
in organizational Aesthetics’, organization 
12(1) 29-50.
Jones, C., and ten Bos, R. (2007) 
‘Introduction’ in Jones, C., ten Bos, R., eds. 
philosophy and organization, London and 
New York: Routledge: 1-17.
Luhmann, N. (1999)  die Kunst der 
Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Méchoulan, E. (2004) ‘Introduction: on the 
Edges of Jacques Rancière’, substance 
33(1): 3-9.
Perrow, C. (2000) ‘An organizational Analysis 
of organizational Theory’, Contemporary 
sociology, 29(3): 469-476.
Pine, B. J., and Gilmore, J. H. eds. (1999) 
the experience economy: Work is theatre 
& every business a stage, Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press.
Rancière, J. (1985) ‘on the Theory of 
Ideology - Althusser’s Politics’, Edgley, R. and 
osborne, R., eds. radical philosophy reader, 
London: Verso: 101-136.
Rancière, J. (1989) the nights of Labor: the 
Workers’ dream in nineteenth-Century France, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Rancière, J. (1991) the ignorant 
schoolmaster: Five Lessons in intellectual 
emancipation, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Rancière, J. (1994) the names of History: 
on the poetics of Knowledge, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Rancière, J. (2000) ‘Literature, Politics, 
Aesthetics: Approaches to Democratic 
Disagreement. Interview with Solange 
Guenoun and James Kavanagh, substance 
29(2): 3-24.
Rancière, J. (2001) ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, 
theory & event 5(3).
Rancière, J. (2002) das Unvernehmen: 
politik und philosophie, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.
Rancière, J. (2003a) short Voyages to the 
Land of the people, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Rancière, J. (2003b) ‘Comment and 
Responses’, theory & event 6(4).
Rancière, J. (2004a) the politics of 
Aesthetics, continuum, London and New 
York: Continuum.
Rancière, J. (2004b) the philosopher and his poor, 
Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Rancière, J. (2004c) the Flesh of Words: 
the politics of Writing, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Rancière, J. (2004d) ‘The Politics of 
Literature’, substance 33(1): 10-24.
Rancière, J. (2005) Chroniques des temps 
consensuels, Paris: Seuil.
Rancière, J. (2006a) Hatred of democracy, 
London and New York: Verso.
Rancière, J. (2006b) ‘Problems and 
Transformations in Critical Art’, C. Bishop, 
ed. participation, Cambridge, MA, The MIT 
press: 83-93.
Rancière, J. (2006c) das ästhetische 
Unbewusste, Zürich and Berlin: diaphanes.
Rancière, J. (2006d) Film Fables, oxford and 
New York: Berg.
Rancière, J. (2007a) das Unbehagen in der 
Ästhetik, Wien: Passagen.
Rancière, J. (2007b) ‘Art of the Possible: An 
Interview with Jacques Rancière’, Artforum 
(March 2007): 256-269.
Rancière, J. (2007c) ‘The Emancipated 
Spectator’, Artforum March 2007: 271-280.
Rancière, J., and Höller, C. (2007) ‘The 
Abandonment of Democracy’, documenta, 
Museum Fridericianum, eds. documenta 
Magazine No. 1-3, 2007: Reader. Cologne: 
Taschen: 449-465.
Rehn, A., and Sköld, D. (2005) ‘‘I Love The 
Dough’: Rap lyrics as a minor economic 
literature’, Culture & organization 11(1): 17-31.
Rockhill, G. (2004) ‘The Silent Revolution’, 
substance 33(1): 54-76.
Ross, K. (1991) ‘Rancière and the Practice of 
Equality’, social text (29): 57-71.
Ross, K. (2007) ‘Introduction: Regime Change. 
Jacques Rancière and Contemporary Art’, 
Artforum (March 2007): 254-255.
Shusterman, R. (2006) ‘The Aesthetic’, 
theory, Culture & society 23(2-3): 237-243.
Sliwa, M., and Cairns, G. (2007) ‘Exploring 
Narratives and Antenarratives of Graffiti 
Artists: Beyond Dichotomies of Commitment 
and Detachment’, Culture & organization 
13(1): 73-82.
Sloterdijk, P. (2007) die Kunst faltet sich ein. 
der ästhetische imperativ. Hamburg: Philo & 
Philo Fine Arts: 405-425.
Steyaert, C. (2006) ‘Cities as Heterotopias 
and Third Spaces: The Example of 
ImagiNation, the Swiss Expo02’, in Clegg, 
S.R. and Kornberger, M., eds. space, 
organizations and Management theory, 
Malmö: Liber & Copenhagen Business School 
Press: 248-265.
Strati, A. (1992) ‘Aesthetic Understanding 
of organizational Life’, Academy of 
Management review 17(3): 568-581.
Strati, A. (2000) ‘The Aesthetic Approach in 
organization Studies’, S. Linstead, H. Höpfl, 
eds. the Aesthetics of organization, London, 
Thousand oaks, New Delhi: Sage: 13-34.
Strati, A. (2007) ‘Sensations, Impressions 
and Reflections on the Configuring of the 
Aesthetic Discourse in organizations’, 
Aesthesis 1(1): 14-22.
Taylor, S.S., and Hansen, H. (2005) ‘Finding 
Form: Looking at the Field of organizational 
Aesthetics’, Journal of Management studies 
42(6): 1211-1231.
Thrift, N. (2002) ‘Performing cultures in the 
new economy’, du Gay, P. and  Pryke, M. eds. 
Cultural economy: Cultural analysis and 
commercial life, London, Thousand oaks, 
New Delhi: Sage: 201-233.
Vickery, J. (2006) ‘organising Art: 
Constructing Aesthetic Value’, Culture & 
organization 12(1): 51-63.
Warren, S. (2006) ‘Post-modern 
Synaesthesia: Paul Klee and ‘The Nature 
of Creation’ ’, Culture & organization 12(2) 
191-198.
Warren, S., and Rehn, A. (2006) ‘oppression, 
Art and Aesthetics’, Consumption Markets & 
Culture 9(2): 81-85.
Warren, S., and Rehn, A. (2007) ‘Messing up 
organizational aesthetics’, Jones, C., ten 
Bos, R., eds. philosophy and organization, 
New York: Routledge: 157-168.
White, H. C. (1993) Careers and Creativity: 
social Forces in the Arts, Boulder, Col.: 
Westview Press.
Witz, A., Warhurst, C. and Nickson, D. 
(2003) ‘The Labour of Aesthetics and the 
Aesthetics of organization’, organization 
10(1) 33-54.
Žižek, S. (2004) ‘The Lesson of Rancière’ in J. 
Rancière, the politics of Aesthetics, London 
and New York: Continuum: 69-79.
Timon Beyes
Center for Social Enterprise
Tigerbergstrasse 2
University of St. Gallen
Switzerland
timon.beyes@unisg.ch
colin halliday
for image gallery and dealer see
www.colinhallidayart.co.uk/ 
info@colinhallidayart.co.uk
